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NOTES and COMMENTS
DEVOLUTION OF BIGHTS UNDER AN UNEXERCISED
OPTION TO PURCHASE LAND
When the parties to a specifically enforceable option to purchase
land die, a problem arises as to the devolution of the contractual
rights in existence at the time of death. Normally a person who dies
intestate has his personal estate settled by his personal representative
who satisfies claims of creditors and distributes the balance to the
next of kin. Title to decedents realty vests in the heirs immediately.
This note is concerned with whether contractual rights and obliga-
tions created by an option to buy land should devolve as personalty,
to the personal representative for the next of kin, or as realty, to the
heirs directly. Special attention is given to the proper rationalization
for explaining the devolution. Although an analysis of "who gets
what" upon death of a party to the option frequently is moot, since
the heirs and the next of kin are usually the same persons, a proper
rationalization is not academic in those jurisdictions where realty is
not subject to debts of the decedent which exceed the personal estate.
Generally, real property is liable for debts of decedent only after the
personalty has been exhausted, and real property is entitled to be
exonerated from encumbrances out of the personalty. Also, the legal
relationship between heir and administrator is somewhat different
from that of next of kin and personal representative.'
The thesis of the discussion here is that the nature of the right is
determinative, and that whether the right is real (having characteristics
of a real property interest) or personal will govern whether the heir
takes directly, or whether the personal representative takes for the
next of kin. Since the courts attempt to decide the nature of the rights
created by the option contract by determining whether an equitable
conversion occurs, it is necessary first to decide whether this doctrine
can be logically applied to an option contract.
The theory of equitable conversion is best illustrated in the case
of a bilateral contract. When two parties enter into a specifically
116 Am. Jun. 793 (1938). In the analogous situation where the decedent
disposes of his property by will, the analysis presented here would be significant.
As between two devisees, one receiving "all realty" and the other receiving "all
personalty," whether or not the contract right is treated as a real right would be
controlling.
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enforceable bilateral contract to convey land, Equity, by a construc-
tive conversion, gives present effect to the contractual rights created.
Thus the vendor, possessing a contract to obtain the purchase money
at the time specified in the contract, is conceived to have the pur-
chase money, while the vendee, possessing a contract right to obtain
the realty at the time specified in the contract, is conceived to have the
realty. Sir George Jessel stated the classical rationalization in this way:
Being a valid contract, it has this remarkable effect, that it converts
the estate, so to say, in Equity; it makes the purchase money a part
of the personal estate of the vendor, and it makes the land a part
of the real estate of the vendee; and therefore all those cases on
the doctrine of constructive conversion are founded simply on this,
that a valid contract actually changes the ownership of the estate in
equity.2 (Italics supplied by writer.)
One of the purposes of the doctrine of equitable conversion is to
determine, in the case of death of one of the contracting parties,
whether interests created by the contract should devolve as realty or
personalty. At Common Law, real property-which included all in-
terests in land except terms for years-went to the heir, while personal
property-which included everything else-went to the executor to pay
debts and to distribute to the next of kin. Therefore, before a con-
tractual right of any sort could pass to the heir, the constructive con-
version, changing the ownership of the estate in equity, bad to be
applied, thereby giving real, or property interest, effect to the right.
The question of whether any particular interest, for instance a con-
tractual right to purchase land, went to the heir or to the personal
representative was dependent upon whether the essentials required
for the application of equitable conversion were present. If equitable
conversion could be effected, the equitable real property interest pos-
sessed by the vendee devolved to his heir, and the equitable personal
property interest possessed by the vendor devolved to his personal
representative.
One thread runs through the cases in which the doctrine of equit-
able conversion has been applied: The contract must be specifically
enforceable by both parties. The AmmucAN LAW OF PROPERTY phrases
this requirement as follows:
Application of conversion theory assumes a specifically enforceable
contract .... If one party is not entitled to specific performance, but
the other party is, .. ., devolution on the side of the party who can-
not enforce the contract is not affected,3 nor, according to the au-
Lysaght v. Edwards 2 Ch. Div. 499, 507 (1876).1In re Thomas, 34 cb. Div. 166 (1886).
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thorities, is devolution on the side of the party who can compel
specific performance. 4-5
Since an option 6 is not specifically enforceable by both parties, the
courts have experienced difficulty in attempting to apply equitable
conversion to an option. Granted, B, the vendee, does possess a real
contractual right, but it is only a right to obtain a bilateral contract
for the conveyance of the land in question. Until exercise of the
option by the vendee, the contract upon which equitable conversion
could apply is not even in existence, but is inchoate and dependent
upon the desire of the vendee as to whether or not he will create it.
What effect, therefore, could the application of equitable conversion
have if a party to the option contract should die before the option is
exercised? Since the classical notion of conversion will apply only
upon exercise of the option, and when the contract becomes bilateral,
it is submitted that the doctrine of equitable conversion is inadequate
to rationalize devolution unless the doctrine is distorted or changed.7
However, courts generally regard equitable conversion as applying
to option contracts for the purchase of land, and attempt to solve
devolution problems by determining whether or not equitable con-
version can take place. 8 This attempted extension of the scope of the
doctrine is probably due to a supposed analogy between the option
contract and the bilateral contract to convey. History and repetition
rather than logic are its roots.
The landmark case applying equitable conversion to an option
contract is Lawes v. Bennett.9 There the court held that exercise of
the option and the formation of the bilateral contract to convey after
the death of the optionor related back to the time of the option agree-
'Newton v. Newton, 11 R.I. 390, 23 Am. Rep. 476 (1876).
13 AmmwCAN LAw Ov PROPERTY 64 (1952). Also, see Simpson, Legislative
Changes in the Law of Equitable Conversion by Contract, 44 YALE L.J. 599, 563
(1935).
'For the legal status of an option supported by consideration, see WYLLisTON,
SEI.EcmoNs FROM Tm LAW or ComNTAcrs 24 (Rev. ed. 1938), where he states:
"An otion for which consideration ispgven .. . is a contract, but is also an offer
which, when accepted will create another contract or a sale.1 For another class of cases in which the application of the doctrine of
equitable conversion reaches unsound results see 4 WILLISTON, CONTRAcTs 2604 et.
seq. (1936). He criticizes determination by equitable conversion of who, be-
tween vendor and vendee, bears the risk of loss or damage to premises when it
occurs between signing of contract to convey, and the time specified for con-
veyance.
'Lawes v. Bennett, 1 Cox Ch. Cas. 167, 29 Eng. Rep. 1111 (1785); Ed-
dington v. Turner, 27 Del. Ch. 411, 38 A. 2d 738 (1944); Sheeby v. Scott, 120
Iowa 551, 104 N.W. 1139 (1905); Rockland-Rockport Lime Co. v. Leary, 203
N.Y. 469, 97 N.E. 43 (1911); Newport Waterworks v. Sisson, 18 R.I. 411, 28 A.
336 (1893).
' Supra note 8.
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ment, and that therefore a conversion was effected. 10 This application
of fictional relation back upon fictional equitable conversion would
allow, on the vendor's side, the personal representative to obtain the
purchase money as a part of decedent's personal estate, and, 'on the
vendee's side, the heir to take the land. The later English cases, and
the majority of American jurisdictions have refused to follow the
"relation back" theory, and have held that the exercise of the option
after death of a party did not relate back to the time of the option
agreement so as to effect, under equitable conversion, the devolution of
the rights of either party."
A recent American case, Eddington v. Turner,'2 expressly re-
pudiated Lawes v. Bennett. There Turner had devised a plot of land
to his sister for life, and subsequently had given a 60 day option to
purchase the land to Eddington. Turner died while the option was
still in force. Eddington sought specific performance and paid the
purchase money into court. In deciding whether the purchase money
should go to the personal representative or to the devisee (for life
only, of course), the Deleware court refuted the relation back of the
conversion and allowed the devisee to take a life interest in the pur-
chase money, with remainder to the heirs. This result was achieved
by denying any conversion before the death of Turner since the
option contract was not obligatory on both parties. This reasoning is
logical as to time of conversion. Does it follow, however, that the
purchase money should go to the devisee, rather than to the personal
representative? The devisee took the land subject to the right of the
holder of the option,' 3 and there would be nothing inequitable in
taking the property from her and not giving her the purchase money.
Although there was no firm contractual right in existence at the
" The vendor bad leased to Douglas, which lease included an option to pur-
chase. Vendor then devised all realty to Bennett, and bequeathed his personal
estate to Bennett and Mary Lawes. The Vendor died, and the option was sub-
sequently exercised. Basing its decision on presumed intent of the testator, the
court decreed that the purchase money was to be distributed as personalty to
Bennett and Lawes in equal shares, rather than solely to devisee.
Eddington v. Turner, Supra note 8; Adams v. Peabody Coal Co., 230 Ill.
469, 82 N.E. 645 (1907); Kern v. Robertson, 92 Mont. 288, 12 P. 2d 565 (1932);
Rockland-Rockport Lime Co. v. Leary, supra note 8; Durepo v. May, 54 A. 2d 15
(R.I. 1947). See also Tyler v. Tyler, 50 Mont. 65, 144 P. 1090 (1944).
Supra note 8.
See In re Marlay, 2 Ch. (Eng.) 264 CA (1915), where the judge states his
opinion as to what interest the heir (devisee) gets when he takes the optionor's
land with the option outstanding: "I think the true view is that the devisee has
an estate in fee defeasible upon the exercise of the option-on no other view can
the devisee's right to rents and rofits until the option has been exercised be sup-
ported." Since the heir never had an unqualified estate in the land, he is not
being deprived of something "his.
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vendor's death, there was a contingent contract right to the purchase
money, which right is personal and therefore vested in the personal
representative.1 4 The fact that the right had not yet ripened does not
change the fact that it was in being, and was created by contract.
When the other party to the contract, the option holder, dies, just
as when the vendor dies, equitable conversion is inadequate to ration-
alize devolution. The same requirement for equitable conversion-
that the contract must be specifically enforceable by both parties-is
lacking. Considering this determinative, the majority of courts adopts
the view that any rights which the optionee may have pass to his
personal representative, and not to his heir, since only contractual
rights are involved.15 Yet, in considering the approach which the
courts have taken-that of affirming or negating the existence of the
requirements for an equitable conversion-the impression remains
that the character of the contractual right in question has not neces-
sarily been determined even if equitable conversion cannot be ef-
fected.
It is submitted that rights and obligations which the decedent has
must be examined as to their nature, and the determination as to who
gets them must be made accordingly. Clark, in discussing just what
the optionee of an option contract has, says:
. . .it is in substance a right to get land at a desirable price; and
such a right seems to savor just as much of realty as if the option
holder had accepted the option before his death.' 6
It must be recognized that this concept is a deviation from the his-
torical notion that property interests can be created only by con-
veyance, while contractual rights arise only by agreement. However,
logically it is appealing and it has ample precedent elsewhere in the
law.'7
'
4 Stone, Equitable Conversion by Contract, 13 CoL. L.R. 369, 379 (1913).
'Sutherland v. Perkins, 75 IIl. 338 (1874); Gustin v. Union School Board
District, 94 Mich. 502, 54 N.W. 156 (1893); In re Adams, 27 Ch. Div. 394 CA
(1884); also see 172 ALR 438 at 449 (1948). However, cf. 19 CoNmEL L.Q.
640, citing Ross v. Parks, 93 Ala. 153, 8 So. 368 (1890) where it is suggested
that holder of an option has something more than a contract right.
'
8 CLARK, EQurrY 146 (1919).
Equitable servitudes, restricting the use of land or the erection of buildings
thereon, may be created by agreement not involving transfer of title to land.
Meade v. Dennistone, 173 Md. 295, 196 A. 330, 114 A.L.R. 1227 (1938); Cotton
v. Cresse, 80 N.J. Eq. 540, 55 A. 600 (1912). Also see annotation 21 Am. St.
Rep. 489 (1891). Agreements of this nature are generally viewed as creating
property rights. Riverbank Improvement Co. v. Chadwick, 228 Mass. 242 117
N.E. 244 (1917). CLARK, EQurry, (1919) on page 119 states: "A speciacally
enforceable right that the land of another shall or shall not be used in a certain
way is of course a property right and not merely a contract right ......
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Since the contractual right possessed by the option holder is a
real right,'8 it should pass to his heir.19 On the correlative matter of
whether the heir could require payment from the personal estate of the
deceased, the logical view would seem to be to require the personal
representative to pay the purchase price. At the time of the optionee's
death, a contractual obligation is in existence, even though it is con-
tingent. Since this conditional obligation to pay is personal in nature,
it should pass as a personal obligation to the personal representative
for settlement out of the personal estate of the decedent. If this is
done, the next of kin are certainly none the worse off than if the
option had been exercised during the life of the option holder. Thus,
by operation of law, the presumed intention of the decedent is carried
out.
In summation, the proper rationalization of devolution of the
option should be along the following lines:
A. Vendor's side: A. gives a specifically enforceable option to B.,
and A. dies while it is still in force. The property should pass to the
heir in fee subject to divestment by operation of condition (exercise
of option). Upon exercise of the option, the purchase money should
go to the personal representative since at the time the optionor died a
personal right to obtain money was in existence, even though it was
contingent.
B. Vendee's side: If B. dies while the option is still in effect, the
heir should have the right to enforce the contract and receive the land,
since the right to exercise the option and obtain the land is a real right
created by contract. The personal representative should be required
to pay the purchase price since a contingent personal obligation to pay
money, arising out of contract, existed at the time of the optionee's
death.
These legal consequences as to devolution are achieved by an ap-
plication of ordinary equitable and property principles, with the
nature of the right being determinative.
EUGENE C. ROEiEL, III
CLAnK, EQUITY 99, Fn. 1: "Juridical rights are all deductions from juridical
remedies; hence, as soon as it became settled that a purchaser could get the
remedy of specific performance of a contract to convey land, the inference or
deduction was that there was already a specifically enforceable right to the prop-
erty, which was the basis for his suit." Therefore, since an option contract may
be enforced by the party holding the option, WL.LsTON, SE.LECTIONS Fnoar THE
LAW OF CONmAcrs 71 (Rev. ed. 1938), that party has a right to the property
which is a real right.
I" CLAnK, EQurry 147 (1919).
